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WHY DENNIS? 
MICHAL R. BELKNAP* 
Those members of Congress who resisted the creation of the 
national investigative agency that became the FBI, according to Athan 
Theoharis, feared establishing a political police force, comparable to the 
ones that had terrorized Napoleonic France and tsarist Russia.1  The 
way to accomplish their objective, they believed, was by restricting any 
organization Congress might create to detecting and prosecuting crimes 
against the United States.  But would such a limitation have made the 
FBI any less of a threat to civil liberties than it became under the 
leadership of Director J. Edgar Hoover?2  For an answer to that 
question one need look no further than the case of Dennis v. United 
States.3  That assault on the First Amendment provides a negative 
answer to the question of whether restricting a national police agency to 
the investigation of federal crimes would indeed protect American civil 
liberties from the threat posed by a political police force. 
Although now largely forgotten, except by historians, Dennis was 
the most important First Amendment case of the 1950s.4  Its significance 
does not lie in the importance of the new constitutional principle the 
Supreme Court announced there.  Within less than two decades, 
Dennis’s “grave and probable danger” test had been largely 
abandoned.5  The case continues to occupy a prominent place in the 
 
* Earl Warren Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, and Adjunct 
Professor of History, University of California, San Diego.  Ph.D., University of Wisconsin; 
J.D., The University of Texas School of Law. 
1. Athan G. Theoharis, A Reassessment of the Wickersham Commission Report: The 
Evolution of a Security Consensus, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1147 (2013).   
2. See KENNETH O’REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS: THE FBI, HUAC, 
AND THE RED MENACE 13 (1983).   
3. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).   
4. See Michal R. Belknap, Why Dennis v. United States Is a Landmark Case, 34 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 289, 289–90 (2009).  
5. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).  In Brandenburg the Court 
announced that in order for the punishment of speech that advocates violence or violation of 
the law to be constitutional, the speech had to advocate immediate violence or violation of the 
law and the violence or violation of the law advocated had to be likely to actually occur 
immediately.  See id. at 447.  To the displeasure of Justices Black and Douglas, the Court did 
not really overrule Dennis.  Belknap, supra note 4, at 292.  However, Dennis’s “grave and 
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legal history of the McCarthy era not because of how it changed 
constitutional doctrine, but because it epitomizes so well the effects of 
McCarthyism on the law.6 
What the Supreme Court did in Dennis is quite clear.  It upheld the 
constitutionality of a federal criminal statute, officially known as the 
Alien Registration Act of 1940, but more commonly referred to as the 
Smith Act, after its sponsor, Representative Howard Smith (D. Va.).7  
The Smith Act made it a crime to teach and advocate the violent 
overthrow of the government or to set up an organization that engaged 
in such teaching and advocacy.8  In other words, it criminalized a certain 
kind of expression. 
The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the Smith Act, taking the 
position that it did not violate the First Amendment.9  In order to reach 
that conclusion, the Court had to depart drastically from established 
doctrine.10  By the 1940’s, the Court had arrived at the position that 
legislation could constitutionally restrict expression only if it prohibited 
speech that posed a “clear and present danger” of some weighty 
substantive evil.11  In other words, the threatened harm had to be both 
serious and likely to occur in the immediate future.  In order to uphold 
convictions of eleven leaders of the Communist Party of the United 
States of America (CPUSA) for violation of the Smith Act, the Court 
substituted the “grave and probable danger” test for the established 
“clear and present danger” one.12  Under its new rule, if the threatened 
evil was a very bad one (such as an attempt to bring about the violent 
overthrow of the government), then expression directed at promoting it 
could be restricted, even if the chances that this speech would actually 
lead to revolutionary violence were slight.13  That the Court was willing 
to abandon the clear and present danger test in order to uphold a law 
such as the Smith Act indicated to Prof. Eugene Rostow of the Yale 
 
probable danger” test has persisted only in one comparatively insignificant area of the law: 
cases in which freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial are in conflict.  Id. at 292–93. 
6. Id. at 289–90, 298–99. 
7. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516. 
8. Alien Registration (Smith) Act, ch. 439, § 2(a)(1), 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006)). 
9. Belknap, supra note 4, at 290. 
10. Id. at 292. 
11. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 994 
n.41 (3d ed. 2006). 
12. See id. at 995. 
13. Id. 
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Law School that America was in the midst of a grave civil liberties 
crisis.14 
By the time he published his assessment of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dennis the country was also in the middle of an all-out legal 
war on the Communist Party.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, the Department of Justice secured the indictment of 132 so-
called “second string” leaders of the CPUSA for violation of the Smith 
Act.15  The Court reconsidered its decision in 1957, and in Yates v. 
United States, while not reversing Dennis, it imposed evidentiary 
requirements for obtaining a constitutional conviction under the Smith 
Act that the government could not meet.16  Yates came too late to save 
the CPUSA, however.  Prosecution under the Smith Act led directly to 
the collapse of the Communist Party, inflicting damage on the 
organization from which it never recovered.17  Thus, the CPUSA, like 
 
14. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 222–24 (1952) (stating that the Court attempts to use the “clear and present danger” test 
but that it is applied in such a way that the test is functionally abandoned).  
15. Michal R. Belknap, Cold War in the Courtroom: The Foley Square Communist Trial, 
in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 207, 225 (Michal R. Belknap ed., rev., expanded ed. 1994). 
16. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320, 327–28 (1957).  Justice Harlan, who wrote 
the Court’s opinion in Yates, had set his clerks to work looking for a way to halt prosecutions 
under the Smith Act.  See Confidential Memorandum from John Marshal Harlan to Messrs. 
Baror and Schlei (July 18, 1956) (available upon request, as a part of John Marshall Harlan’s 
Papers, from Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library).  The government could have retried the 
Yates defendants under the evidentiary standards the Court had laid down in that decision, 
but apparently concluding it could not satisfy them, chose not to do so.  MICHAL R. 
BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 259 (1977) [hereinafter BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL 
JUSTICE].  Yates did not benefit any of the Dennis defendants, nor the six convicted in a 
Baltimore trial and eleven in a second New York trial, all of whose appeals had been 
exhausted by the time the Supreme Court ruled.  Id. at 258–59.  But Yates eventually saved 
from prison all of the other Communist leaders who had been prosecuted for conspiring to 
violate the Smith Act (except for four who had been acquitted by a jury in Cleveland, and one 
there and one elsewhere who were acquitted by trial judges).  Id. at 226, 259.  Some 
defendants gained their freedom because the government chose not to bring them to trial, 
some because convictions it had already obtained were reversed by courts of appeal, and in 
one case in which it managed to obtain a conviction on retrial in a court that claimed to be 
following Yates, because this second conviction was reversed on appeal.  Id. at 259–60.  
17. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 185–206.  The 
prosecutions inspired the Party to adopt suicidal self-protective measures that included 
purging thousands of members in order to eliminate any it suspected might be informers and 
incapacitating many of its leaders by sending them underground.  Id. at 191–94.  Some of 
those isolated from the Party while hiding in the underground developed doubts about recent 
Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) policies that were exacerbated 
by events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  Id. at 195.  The CPUSA collapsed 
organizationally, and lost the bulk of its membership in 1956–1957.  Id. at 197. 
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the First Amendment, became a victim of the Dennis case. 
That all of this happened is fairly clear.  More difficult is explaining 
why it happened.  To what do we owe a prosecution of the national 
leadership of a small radical organization (the CPUSA never had as 
many as many as 75,000 members18) that had such disastrous 
consequences for the constitutional law of freedom of expression?  
While it may no longer be easy to “separate[] orthodoxy from 
revisionism” in this field,19 for years the prevailing view has been that 
Dennis was part of the unjustified and even irrational assault on radicals 
and dissenters that has come to be known to as McCarthyism.20  That 
phenomenon was an outgrowth of the Cold War between the United 
States and its Communist rival for geopolitical dominance, the USSR, 
that developed during the late 1940’s.  As Ellen Schrecker explains, 
“once the Cold War transformed the Soviet Union into an enemy, it 
took little imagination to see American Communism as a threat to 
national security.”21  The “plausibility of the threat—based on the 
connection between the commonly exaggerated image of Communism 
and an equally exaggerated notion of the nation’s vulnerability to it . . . 
spurred American policymakers to protect internal security by cracking 
down on domestic Communists.”22  Activities that conservatives “had 
previously . . . opposed for political and ideological reasons now became 
matters of national security.”23  The result was Dennis.  As Richard 
Fried puts it, the Smith Act trial of the CPUSA leaders was a “response 
largely to domestic political considerations” that “was far more 
dangerous to the republic it purported to protect than [to] those who 
were under indictment.”24  It was something for which there was little, if 
any, excuse.25 
 
18. Id. at 190. 
19. Erik Tarloff, Red Faces, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at 28. 
20. For examples of the point of view that might be characterized as the traditional 
liberal one, see generally BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE, supra note 16; ELLEN 
SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 190–200 (1998); 
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 551–78 (appearing as Volume 12 in THE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2006)). 
21. SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at 161. 
22. Id. at 155. 
23. Id.  
24. RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 
84 (1990). 
25. Id. 
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While this has been the standard interpretation of Dennis at least 
since the publication of my Cold War Political Justice in 1977, evidence 
that has become available in recent years raises serious doubts about its 
validity.  As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, some 
Russian archival material was opened up to Western researchers.  In 
1995 Emory University professors Harvey Klehr and John Haynes 
Holmes and a Russian archivist, Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov published 92 
of these documents under the title The Secret World of American 
Communism.26  They provided “hard proof . . . that the Communist 
Party U.S.A. was active in espionage and clandestine activities.”27 
An even more important development was the 1995 release of the 
Venona intercepts.  A super-secret World War II project of the U.S. 
Army’s Signal Intelligence Service, Venona managed with great 
difficulty, and only after the war had ended, to decipher the codes used 
by the Soviets in transmitting correspondence, much of which involved 
espionage, between Moscow and the Soviet consulate in Washington.28  
“By 1948 the accumulating evidence from . . . decoded Venona cables 
showed that the Soviets had recruited spies in virtually every major 
American government agency of military or diplomatic importance.”29  
Many of these recruits were American Communists.30  For decades 
Venona was such a closely guarded secret that even top officials of the 
U.S. government, including Attorney General Tom Clark and President 
Harry Truman, were unaware there even was such a project, let alone of 
what it had learned.31  But when Venona’s explosive findings were 
finally released in 1995, they seemed to establish conclusively that the 
organization whose leaders were targeted by the Dennis prosecution 
posed a real and substantial threat to American national security.32 
 
26. Stephen Goode, We Told You So, INSIGHT, Oct. 6–13, 1997, at 8. 
27. Id. 
28. JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY KLEHR, VENONA: DECODING SOVIET 
ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 9 (1999). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 15; ATHAN THEOHARIS, CHASING SPIES: HOW THE FBI FAILED IN 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BUT PROMOTED THE POLITICS OF MCCARTHYISM IN THE COLD 
WAR YEARS 9 (2002); ALLEN WEINSTEIN & ALEXANDER VASSILIEV, THE HAUNTED 
WOOD: SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA—THE STALIN ERA 291 (1999). 
32. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 28, at 11–12; HERBERT ROMERSTEIN & ERIC 
BREINDEL, THE VENONA SECRETS: EXPOSING SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND AMERICA’S 
TRAITORS 234 (2000); KATHERINE A. S. SIBLEY, RED SPIES IN AMERICA: STOLEN SECRETS 
AND THE DAWN OF THE COLD WAR 188–89 (2004).  Ellen Schrecker argues that “the records 
that have been released” do not establish “whether the transmission of secrets actually 
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Only a few hardcore skeptics, the most outspoken of whom is Victor 
Navasky, still doubt this.33  But is the fact that Communists actually 
threatened American national security enough to explain why Eugene 
Dennis and the other leaders of the CPUSA were put on trial for 
violation of the Smith Act?  They were, after all, charged not with 
espionage but with teaching and advocating Marxism-Leninism.  Fried 
insists this case “served justice badly,”34 and Peter L. Steinberg has 
suggested that the Dennis prosecution was not really motivated by 
concerns about national security at all.  Rather, Steinberg contends, the 
leaders of the CPUSA were the victims of an anticommunist campaign 
by the FBI, intended to advance the right-wing ideological agenda and 
bureaucratic interests of the Bureau.35  According to him, the FBI’s 
“role in securing Smith Act prosecutions [of the leaders of the CPUSA] 
. . . was direct, persistent, and persuasive.”36  His FBI-centered 
interpretation of the case has received support from Athan Theoharis.37 
Their focus on the Bureau has much to commend it.  So too does the 
contention that the Dennis case was a product of McCarthyism.  
Certainly, the Smith Act prosecution of the leaders of the CPUSA 
contributed to the anti-Communist hysteria that gripped the country 
around 1950.  As Ellen Schrecker has emphasized, what was important 
in the rise of McCarthyism was not whatever Communist threat to 
America actually existed but rather the way that threat was perceived.38  
Likewise, what is important about the inception of the Dennis case is 
not whether those who taught and advocated communism posed a threat 
to America but the fact that others perceived they did.  In March 1948 a 
crowd in Columbus, Ohio drove off people handing out Communist 
leaflets.39  A few days later, a mob in that Ohio city wrecked a 
Communist leader’s home.40  Participants in a Communist meeting in 
 
occurred or whether American intelligence agents just assumed that it had.”  SCHRECKER, 
supra note 20, at 167.   
33. For Navasky’s views, see Victor Navasky, Cold War Ghosts: The Case of the Missing 
Red Menace, THE NATION, July 16, 2001, at 36 and Ronald Radosh, Letter to the Editor, 
Communists in America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2000, at A14. 
34. FRIED, supra note 24, at 94. 
35. PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT “RED MENACE”: UNITED STATES 
PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947–1952, at 92, 95–100, 108 (1984).  
36. Id. at 97. 
37. THEOHARIS, supra note 31, at 80. 
38. See SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at 163. 
39. FRIED, supra note 24, at 95. 
40. Id. 
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Rochester, New York were forced by a mob to disperse.41  Such hostility 
toward those who advocated radical ideas was the essence of 
McCarthyism.  It was also what caused FBI informant Angela Calomiris 
to fear for her safety even before she took the stand as a government 
witness in the Dennis trial and at a time when she was still believed by 
everyone to be a committed Communist.42  That trial and the others of 
CPUSA leaders that followed it “may well have signaled to the public 
that Communists, never beloved, had lost what scraps of legitimacy they 
ever had.”43  It fueled the very anti-Communist hysteria that helped give 
rise to the Dennis prosecution.44 
But while there is reason to believe that the attitudes associated with 
McCarthyism helped to bring about the Dennis prosecution, one cannot 
ignore the fact that American Communists actually did engage in spying 
on behalf of the Soviet Union.  That made them a very real threat to 
national security and fully justified prosecuting those who engaged in 
such activity for espionage and related offenses.  “The deciphered 
Venona messages . . . showed that a disturbing number of high-ranking 
U.S. government officials consciously maintained a clandestine 
relationship with Soviet intelligence agencies and had passed 
extraordinarily sensitive information to the Soviet Union . . . .”45   
Those who engaged in such criminal conduct included some high-
ranking leaders of the CPUSA.  For example, Steve Nelson, a member 
of the Communist Party’s National Committee, spied on the American 
atomic bomb project during World War II.46  Even the head of the 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. 
45. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 28, at 9.  The documents passed to the Soviets 
included ones originating at the highest level of the Treasury Department.  See 6 F.O.I.A. 
JULIUS ROSENBERG ET AL., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SILVERMASTER CASE FILE 
NO. 65–56402, at 25 [hereinafter “SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 6”] (including statement of 
Elizabeth Bentley “Gregory”), available at http://education-research.org/csr/holdings/silverma
ster/summaries.htm.  Elizabeth Bentley’s statement was summarized in memorandum from 
J.C. Strisplund to D.M. Ladd on October 21, 1946.  82 F.O.I.A. JULIUS ROSENBERG ET AL., 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SILVERMASTER CASE FILE NO. 65–56402, 
[hereinafter “SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 82”] available at http://education-research.org/csr/ho
ldings/silvermaster/summaries.htm.  Soviet Intelligence Service also obtained information 
from the State Department, the War Department, the Office of Strategic Services, the 
Foreign Economic Administration, and the Department of Justice.  Id. at 5.  
46. ROMERSTEIN & BREINDEL, supra note 32, at 255; THEOHARIS, supra note 31, at 49–
50. 
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CPUSA, Earl Browder, was a Soviet spy.  Browder, who served as the 
Party’s general secretary from 1932 to 1945, not only knew about but 
also personally participated in spying.47  Fearful of being incriminated in 
espionage, he collected only economic, social, and political information 
himself, and did not want to see any technical production or military 
material.48  But the fact of the matter is that the head of the American 
communist movement was actively engaged in recruiting and running 
spies for the Soviet Union.49  Indeed, he handpicked those CPUSA 
officials who served as sources, couriers, and group handlers for the 
NKGB (Soviet secret police).50  Eugene Dennis, the lead defendant in 
the Dennis case, also seems to have had some kind of involvement with 
Soviet intelligence.51 
But while leaders of the CPUSA did spy for the Soviet Union, the 
Dennis case was not an espionage prosecution and the Smith Act 
punishes seditious expression rather than the stealing of government 
secrets.  There were two obvious reasons why the Justice Department 
chose to prosecute under that law in 1948.  One, emphasized by 
Theoharis, is that it lacked sufficient usable evidence to prove 
Communists had engaged in espionage.52  Venona messages were, of 
course, not available for use in court, nor could prosecutors employ 
information obtained employing “sensitive investigative techniques,” 
such as “access to bank records.”53  Also unavailable was evidence 
obtained using such illegal methods as “break-ins, wiretaps, bugs, [and] 
mail openings.”54 
There was, however, another, perhaps more important, reason why 
the Justice Department chose to prosecute the Communist leaders 
 
47. SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 82, supra note 45, at 4–5; ROMERSTEIN & BREINDEL, 
supra note 32, at 72, 84.   
48. SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 6, supra note 45, at 93. 
49. ROMERSTEIN & BREINDEL, supra note 32, at 84; see also SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 
6, supra note 45, at 92–93.  A few weeks before his death in 1973, while not admitting that he 
personally had engaged in espionage, Browder told a reporter for the United Press that “[w]e 
had people” who “would inform us from the enemy camp because they sympathized with our 
position.”  GUENTER LEWY, THE CAUSE THAT FAILED: COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL LIFE 81 (1990). 
50. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 31, at 302. 
51. ROMERSTEIN & BREINDEL, supra note 32, at 288. 
52. See THEOHARIS, supra note 31, at 80. 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  The official disclosure of the Venona Project did not come until July 11, 1995, 
when the first batch of messages was released.  See HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 28, at 6. 
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under the Smith Act.  Steinberg points out that J. Edgar Hoover 
wanted, as he told Attorney General Tom Clark, to “establish the illegal 
status of the Communist Party of the United States of America.”55  
Clark stated publicly on February 5, 1948 that the Smith Act was not an 
adequate prosecutorial tool.56  But that was true only if the objective was 
punishing individual Communists.57  As far as Hoover was concerned, 
the real goal of this prosecution was to establish that the CPUSA taught 
the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the government 
by force and violence.58  The FBI hoped to identify the Communist 
Party with treason and espionage, and to do so without having to charge 
any particular Communists with committing one of those offenses.59 
Dennis served very nicely what Steinberg sees as the objectives of 
the FBI.  But there are problems with the explanation that he offers for 
the case.  For that matter, there are also problems with trying to explain 
Dennis as an effort to combat a genuine threat to national security and 
to depict it as a consequence of McCarthyism.  The last of these 
explanations is particularly problematic because it is so unclear whether 
McCarthyism even existed when a federal grand jury voted on June 29, 
1948 to indict the Dennis defendants.  That was a year and one half 
before Senator Joe McCarthy delivered the famous speech at Wheeling, 
West Virginia, in which he charged that members of the Communist 
Party, although known to the Secretary of State, were still working and 
shaping policy in the State Department.60  If that is when McCarthyism 
began, obviously it did not inspire the Dennis prosecution.  But while 
agreed that the beginning of the second Red Scare predates McCarthy’s 
Wheeling speech, historians cannot agree on much more than that.  
They are in accord only in placing its commencement sometime between 
1945 and 1949.61  Schrecker rather imprecisely states that McCarthyism 
“dominated American politics during the late 1940s and 1950s.”62 
Thus, McCarthyism might have precipitated the Dennis case.  But 
the argument that it actually did so is far from conclusive.  The Supreme 
 
55. STEINBERG, supra note 35, at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
56. Id. at 98. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 99–100. 
59. Id. at 102. 
60. Id. at 186.   
61. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF JOE 
MCCARTHY 85 (1983). 
62. SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at x. 
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Court rendered its decision in Dennis on June 4, 1951, so that decision 
clearly could be a product of McCarthyism.63  But a federal grand jury 
voted to indict the defendants on June 29, 1948, and their trial started on 
March 7, 1949.64  Both of these events preceded McCarthy’s Wheeling 
speech, so if McCarthyism began earlier than that, whether the case as a 
whole was caused by McCarthyism depends on when within a very 
imprecisely defined period that phenomenon made its first appearance 
on the American scene.  The Dennis case exemplifies most of the 
features that have made McCarthyism infamous.  But that, of course, is 
not sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the two. 
Just as it is doubtful that Dennis was caused by McCarthyism, so it 
also seems unlikely that the case was a response to the real threat that 
Communists posed to national security.65  The Communist Party leader 
most involved in espionage was Earl Browder.66  Yet he was not among 
those the Justice Department charged in 1948 with violation of the 
Smith Act.67  Indeed, by the time the Dennis defendants were indicted, 
Browder had been ousted from his position as general secretary of the 
CPUSA and expelled from the Party for failing to support its adoption 
of a hard line toward the West.68 
What finally proved that American Communists had engaged in 
espionage, and thus had indeed constituted the real threat to national 
security that conservatives had always insisted they were, was the 
Venona intercepts and documents long hidden from Western eyes in 
Soviet archives.  Yet none of this evidence became available until the 
1990s, long after the Dennis defendants had been indicted, tried, 
convicted, and imprisoned.69  Whatever it may prove, it clearly had 
nothing to do with the bringing of the case against them. 
What makes it most doubtful that the Dennis case was brought to 
protect the United States from Communist espionage, however, is 
simply the nature of the charges lodged against the defendants.  They 
were accused of conspiring to teach and advocate the violent overthrow 
of the government.  They were not accused of engaging in revolutionary 
action, nor even of agreeing to do so.  This was a case about advocacy, 
 
63. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 494 (1951). 
64. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 51, 77. 
65. See HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 28, at 21–22. 
66. ROMERSTEIN & BREINDEL, supra note 32, at 84.   
67. See Belknap, supra note 4, at 290. 
68. ROMERSTEIN & BREINDEL, supra note 32, at 72; SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at 18.  
69. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 28, at 6. 
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and by its very nature that is something that must be done publicly.  As 
Geoffrey Stone, one of the leading authorities on freedom of speech, 
says “[t]he notion that the government would be helpless to combat a 
truly dangerous conspiracy if it could not suppress its public expression 
is absurd.”70 
But if that notion is absurd, then what about the idea that it was the 
machinations of the FBI that were responsible for the Dennis case?  
Theoharis agrees with Steinberg in assigning responsibility for the 
prosecution to the Bureau.  But he explains its motivation differently.  
Rather than being inspired by a mixture of right-wing ideology and a 
desire to advance its own bureaucratic interests, he says, the FBI was 
motivated by the need to prevent disclosure of the fact that it repeatedly 
resorted to investigative methods that were “sensitive” and even 
downright illegal.71  “The less risky course was to seek indictments under 
the Smith Act, then rely on FBI informers who had infiltrated the 
Communist party to testify about Communist revolutionary plans, and 
question the indicted Communist officials and FBI informers about the 
texts of Communist publications,” Theoharis concludes.72 
He ignores, of course, the extent to which indicted CPUSA leaders 
could have disrupted this scheme by invoking their Fifth Amendment 
right to refuse to give evidence against themselves.  Although flawed, 
however, Theoharis’s explanation for the Dennis case gets closer to the 
truth than any of the others.  He puts the focus where it belongs: on the 
incentives that motivate law enforcement agencies.  In attempting to 
combat the “Red Menace,” the FBI found itself in an awkward position.  
For the Bureau is both a law enforcement agency and a 
counterintelligence one.73  The latter role called for it to find out 
everything it could about the enemy’s espionage activities.  If that 
required agents to break the law, that was acceptable—at least so long 
as they did not get caught.  The Bureau’s law enforcement role was 
different.  In order to perform it successfully, agents not only had to 
catch those who broke the law, but also to obtain by legal means 
evidence against them that would be admissible in court.  The 
explanation for the Dennis case lies in the FBI’s unsuccessful efforts to 
perform this law enforcement role successfully. 
 
70. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 408 (2004).  
71. THEOHARIS, supra note 31, at 80. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 11. 
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Although it had not showed much interest in Soviet espionage 
before 1940, in that year the FBI began piecing together a picture of 
Russian intelligence operations in the United States.74  Agents did 
enough “prowling around” to at least make themselves an annoyance to 
Russian spies.75  They actually “hounded” some Soviet agents right out 
of the country.76  But the FBI’s main success in the counterespionage 
field was wiretapping all of the Soviet organizations in the United 
States.77  Since wiretapping was of dubious legality, the Bureau did not 
often gather enough evidence to provide the basis for an espionage 
prosecution.78 
Elizabeth Bentley promised to give the FBI what it had previously 
lacked.  Bentley was a Soviet spy, although she did not immediately 
disclose this when she walked into the Bureau’s New Haven, 
Connecticut field office in August of 1945.79  Nor did she say anything 
about it during a second meeting with the FBI two months later.80  It was 
not until nearly three months after the FBI first interviewed her that 
Bentley “furnished information relative to a Russian espionage ring 
with which she was affiliated.”81  Although slow in coming, the 107-page 
statement that she signed on November 30, 1945 was pure gold to an 
agent with counterintelligence responsibilities.82  Filled with names and 
descriptions, it identified more than eighty alleged Soviet spies in the 
United States.83  Some of these were highly placed government officials, 
such as Lauchlin Currie, the chief economist in the White House and 
Harry Dexter White, the chief economist at the Treasury Department.84  
Many of the individuals Bentley mentioned had long been suspected of 
 
74. SIBLEY, supra note 32, at 2. 
75. Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
76. Id. 
77. Id.  
78. There was no statute authorizing wiretapping.  However, in 1940 President 
Roosevelt issued a secret executive order authorizing it.  Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The 
Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR 
Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1046, 1050 (2008). 
79. See KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RED SPY QUEEN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ELIZABETH 
BENTLEY 89–91 (2002). 
80. Id. at 95–96. 
81. Id. at 99–100. 
82. Id. at 100, 107. 
83. Id. at 100.  
84. SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 6, supra note 45, at 25. 
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having Communist sympathies.85 
But there was much about Elizabeth Bentley and about her claims 
concerning involvement in espionage that called for skepticism.  There 
was, of course, the fact that it was not until her third visit to the FBI that 
she mentioned being a spy.86  Initially, she claimed to have come in 
because she feared a man she was dating, Peter Heller, might be 
impersonating a National Guard officer and falsely claiming to be a 
government spy.87  During her second interview with the FBI, Bentley 
said she suspected Heller was a spy for the Soviet Union.88  Not until her 
third conversation with agents did she begin telling the story, elaborated 
fully in her 107-page statement, about herself being a Soviet operative.89 
It occurred to the agent who took the second of her three grossly 
inconsistent statements that Bentley might be a psychopath.90  She was a 
“melodramatic, unstable, and alcoholic woman,” who seemed to the 
agents who first debriefed her to be “slightly hysterical” as well.91  In 
addition, this self-described Soviet spy was provably dishonest.  She had 
taken credit for a master’s thesis actually written by her faculty advisor’s 
assistant.92 
Small wonder that in a memorandum to his boss, White House 
Counsel Clark Clifford, George M. Elsey exhibited skepticism about 
Bentley’s revelations.93  His advice was that the White House should 
have the Attorney General furnish it with a description of all the data 
she claimed to have obtained for Russian agents and that it then seek to 
determine how much of this information was freely available to the 
Soviet government through routine official liaison.94  “The purpose of 
this would be to make it clear that Miss Bentley was not successful in 
transmitting secret material to the Russians that they did not already 
have,” Elsey wrote.95 
 
85. OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 100. 
86. Id. at 99. 
87. Id. at 76–78, 90. 
88. Id. at 96. 
89. Id. at 100. 
90. Id. at 96. 
91. SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at 172. 
92. OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 7. 
93. See Memorandum from George M. Elsey to Clark Clifford (August 16, 1948) 
(available upon request from the Harry S. Truman Library). 
94. Id.  
95. Id.  
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He and his superiors at the White House were probably trying to 
save themselves from the embarrassment of having overlooked a Soviet 
spy.  On the other hand, Elsey was right to be skeptical of Bentley’s 
story.  In the days when I served as an Army counterintelligence agent, I 
would have given her the lowest possible rating on the reliability scale 
we used.  Because many of the people she identified as spies had long 
been suspected of Communist sympathies, the information she supplied 
would have fared a little better in such an evaluation.  The FBI found 
impressive the fact that Bentley “has reported with a high degree of 
accuracy . . . [policy issues] which were only known within the 
Government itself.”96  But the fact of the matter is that a story 
implicating at least eighty people, some of them fairly prominent, in 
espionage merited skepticism.97  Confronted with a somewhat unlikely 
story from an utterly unreliable source, the FBI did exactly what any 
good investigative agency would do.  It set out to verify what Elizabeth 
Bentley had told it. 
The effort the Bureau made was massive.  Led by its 
counterintelligence chief, seventy-two agents swung into action on what 
the Bureau considered the biggest espionage case in its history.98  
Hoover declared that there would be “no limit” to the manpower 
assigned to this investigation.99  Eventually, the Bureau had 250 agents 
working the case.100 
But this massive effort yielded no convictions.  In fact, it failed to 
produce even a single arrest.101  One reason for this was the inability of 
the FBI to decide whether its mission was counterintelligence or law 
enforcement.  Much of the furious activity that it undertook in response 
to Bentley’s confession was illegal.102  This included twenty-two 
wiretaps.103  Agents planned a “black bag job” (i.e. a break-in) of 
Bentley’s hotel room while she was away.104  They opened the mail of 
the men and women she had accused.105 
 
96. SIBLEY, supra note 32, at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
97. See OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 100–02. 
98. Id. at 102. 
99. Id. 
100. SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at 173. 
101. See id. 
102. See OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 102. 
103. SIBLEY, supra note 32, at 127. 
104. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
105. OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 102; SIBLEY, supra note 32, at 127. 
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The Bureau was undeterred by the fact that such tactics violated the 
law.  While it wanted to identify spies partly so it could apprehend them, 
its primary objective was determining whether the men and women 
Bentley had identified as spies were continuing to steal government 
secrets.106  Preventing future espionage was more important than 
punishing that which had already occurred.  The consequence of FBI 
prioritizing, Theoharis says, was “to forestall prosecution.”107 
But it did not have to have that effect.  The way the Bureau chose to 
resolve what he calls “the counterintelligence dilemma” combined with 
bad luck to prevent prosecution.108  Federal prosecutors actually 
managed to convict Soviet spy Judith Coplon.109  But that conviction was 
overturned by an appellate court because of the Bureau’s wiretapping 
and an illegal arrest.110  Although this appears at first glance to be a case 
where a choice had to be made between counterintelligence and good 
law enforcement, it was not.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
objected to the fact that the FBI had arrested the defendant without a 
warrant in the absence of any apparent reason for doing so.111  The 
court’s problem with the wiretapping was not that it had been done, but 
rather that the government had refused to let the defense see the 
records on which the trial judge had based a ruling that the taps had not 
led to any evidence introduced at the trial.112 
Unlike the Coplon wiretaps, Elizabeth Bentley’s disclosures to the 
FBI had not become evidence in a trial.113  But they could have.  Hoover 
knew that without corroboration, her testimony would not have much 
value as evidence against others.114  But Bentley herself could have been 
convicted on the basis of her own voluntary admissions.  Before anyone 
else was likely to be found guilty of the crimes she alleged they had 
committed, a prosecutor would need additional evidence.  While the 
Venona cables would have corroborated many of Bentley’s allegations, 
they were unavailable, being “too highly classified to be produced at a 
 
106. THEOHARIS, supra note 31, at 84. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 83. 
109. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1950). 
110. Id. at 635–38. 
111. Id. at 635–36. 
112. Id. at 637–38. 
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114. Id. 
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trial.”115  Even without them an enterprising prosecutor might have 
successfully tried some of those she accused for conspiracy.  One of the 
sources from whom Bentley’s lover and partner in espionage, Jacob 
Golos, obtained information was communist journalist Louis Budenz.116  
Budenz left the Party in 1945 to return to the Catholic Church and 
subsequently became the star prosecution witness in the Dennis trial.117  
It should have been possible to establish, using his testimony and 
Bentley’s, that the two of them and the now-deceased Golos, were part 
of a conspiracy.  According to Bentley, she knew Golos and Budenz 
“were rather well acquainted,” and her spy lover had indicated to the 
journalist that the two of them were “associated.”118  Thereafter, it “was 
informally arranged that Budenz would supply information to [Bentley] 
in the manner he formerly had to Golos.”119  Because “secrecy and 
concealment are essential features of [a] successful conspiracy,” the law 
allows the conviction of alleged conspirators “upon showing sufficiently 
the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without 
requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation 
of others.”120  Evidence offered to establish the existence of a conspiracy 
is “often admitted under [very] loose standards.”121 
They are certainly loose enough that Helen Tenney, who was one of 
Bentley’s sources, could have been successfully prosecuted, along with 
Bentley, Budenz, and Golos (if he were still alive), for entering into a 
conspiracy having as at least one of its objectives the commission of 
espionage.  This would have been possible, even though the only 
evidence the government could have offered against Tenney herself, 
beyond Bentley’s allegations, was the testimony of FBI agents that they 
had observed the two women having lunch together in a Washington, 
D.C. restaurant.122 
In short, there was legally acquired evidence that could have been 
introduced at a trial of members of Bentley’s espionage ring.  There was 
just not enough of it.  The counterintelligence dilemma did not so much 
 
115. SCHRECKER, supra note 20, at 177; see also OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 155. 
116. OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 57. 
117. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 83–86.  
118. SILVERMASTER FILE VOL. 6, supra note 45, at 38.   
119. Id.  
120. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.1(b)(4) at 261 (2d ed. 
2003). 
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122. See OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 108–09. 
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forestall prosecution as it forced prosecutors to find additional evidence 
with which to corroborate the former spy’s allegations, evidence that 
had neither been illegally acquired nor tainted by being derived from 
some that had been procured illegally.123  The Coplon case suggests that 
while difficult, that would not have been impossible.  Unfortunately, 
although the FBI spent a year and a half trying, it failed. 
The most promising approach was to substantiate Bentley’s 
allegations by turning her into a double agent.  The Bureau’s idea was to 
have her continue what she had been doing, all the while collecting 
evidence about the activities of her associates.124  Since she and agents 
who observed her spying could have testified from personal knowledge 
about crimes they had seen being committed,125 none of the evidence the 
Bureau had obtained illegally would have to be employed.  With the 
objective of becoming a double agent, Bentley set up a meeting with her 
Soviet handler, which agents had under surveillance.126  But she found 
him “cagey” and their conversation was essentially “innocuous.”127 
The FBI’s plan had been wrecked by Kim Philby.  Philby was 
himself a double agent.128  He was the chief of counterintelligence for the 
British secret service, and the United States shared intelligence 
information with its British allies.129  As a result of this sharing 
arrangement, Hoover informed Sir William Stephenson, the British 
station chief in the United States, about the Bentley’s statement and her 
defection.130  Philby was likely given this information by Stephenson 
because Philby informed the NKGB of Bentley’s defection less than two 
weeks after she began her statements.131 
Warned by Philby that she had defected, the Soviets quickly began 
shutting down NKGB operations in America.132  On November 23 they 
instructed all of their station chiefs in the United States to terminate 
immediately their connections with anyone associated with the turncoat 
 
123. See THEOHARIS, supra note 31, at 84. 
124. OLMSTED, supra note 79, at 103. 
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spy and to warn agents about her “betrayal.”133  FBI surveillance made 
getting the word out to the spies Bentley had supervised difficult, but 
soon almost all of them had been warned and the entire operation for 
which she had been responsible had ceased.134  The Russians in charge of 
it had left the country.135  For a year, Bentley continued to pretend she 
had not become an informer, while her sources and the Soviets 
continued to pretend they did not know she was one.136  But it was all for 
show.  “Thanks to Philby, Elizabeth [Bentley] would become the least 
successful double agent in FBI history.”137 
Unaware of what Philby had done, the Bureau kept slogging along, 
but its investigation was going nowhere.138  Nor was the criminal 
prosecution for which this investigation was supposed to provide the key 
evidence.139  Had it not been derailed, there probably never would have 
been a Dennis case.  The causal relationship between the failed criminal 
investigation and the ideologically driven prosecution of the leaders of 
the CPUSA is complex, however.  The Bentley probe was over by early 
1947.140  On April 15 of that year, the Bureau “descended on the homes 
and businesses of twelve of Elizabeth[] [Bentley’s] most important 
former contacts.”141  Agents hoped that by simultaneously interrogating 
these suspects they could get at least one of them to “crack,” but “none 
of the major figures [in the case] admitted anything.”142  The FBI’s 
criminal investigation of the Bentley espionage case was effectively over 
more than a year before indictments were filed on July 20, 1948, 
charging the leaders of the CPUSA with violation of the Smith Act.143 
Fortunately for the Bureau, there was a Plan B.  Indeed, from 
Hoover’s perspective, it may have been preferable to an espionage 
prosecution.144  As far back as July 7, 1945 he had directed “all his field 
offices to gather material about the illegal status and activities of the 
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Communist Movement.”145  In early 1946, the head of the Bureau’s 
Domestic Intelligence Division, D. Milton Ladd, had sent Hoover a 
“blind memorandum” proposing “prosecution of communist leaders 
under the Smith Act as part of the campaign to educate the American 
people to the real dangers of communism.”146  By early 1948, Ladd’s 
proposal had matured into a massive investigative summary (often 
characterized as a “brief”) that drew together all of the evidence the 
FBI had against the Communist Party.147  It even included 546 exhibits 
that could be presented at a trial.148  Hoover forwarded this investigative 
summary to Attorney General Clark on February 5, 1948, accompanied 
by a memorandum characterizing it as “a brief to establish the illegal 
status of the Communist Party.”149  What Ladd and Hoover were 
proposing served Clark’s own needs, for he was under intense political 
pressure from Republicans to do something about the Communists.150  
The very day the GOP-controlled House Committee on Un-American 
Activities (HUAC) subjected the Attorney General to a savage grilling, 
demanding to know why the Justice Department had failed to use the 
Smith Act against the CPUSA, the attorney general asked for the FBI’s 
brief.151 
The prosecution the Bureau was promoting served not only Clark’s 
needs, but also those of his special assistants, T. Vincent Quinn and 
Thomas J. Donegan.  They had been given the job of presenting 
evidence to a federal grand jury in New York that had been empanelled 
to hear Bentley’s charges.152  The grand jurors believed the confessed 
spy, but no other witnesses corroborated her story.153  Clark realized no 
one was going to be indicted on the basis of Bentley’s unsubstantiated 
allegations, but he was seeking political cover from HUAC, should it 
ever raise the issue of why nothing had been done about them.154  
Convening the grand jury was easier than getting rid of it without 
indictments.  In order to avoid what he recognized would be a public 
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relations disaster, Quinn suggested that it continue to meet while the 
Justice Department presented it with a different, but related, case.155  
The one he had in mind was the Smith Act prosecution of the CPUSA 
that Ladd and Hoover had been promoting.156 
The case they had concocted was ideally suited to save the Attorney 
General and his two assistants from severe political embarrassment.  
Unfortunately, it was also an unsatisfactory one—at least in the opinion 
of the man who would have to try it, John F.X. McGohey, the United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.157  McGohey did 
not the think the espionage grand jury should be hearing this case at 
all.158  Furthermore, he did not want to be identified with what had been 
presented to it thus far.  McGohey tried to read the FBI’s huge “brief,” 
but by April 29, he still had managed to wade through only the first 657 
pages.159  By then McGohey had concluded it was possible to support a 
charge of violation of the Smith Act, but he believed a great deal more 
investigation was needed before an indictment could be drafted.160 
It is hardly surprising that McGohey considered more investigation 
necessary.  On March 30, Bentley had been called back before the grand 
jury.161  “Quinn and Donegan peppered her with questions” about the 
CPUSA’s “plan to overthrow the government of the U.S.A. by force 
and violence,” and the answers they got were not helpful.162  She 
“disputed their contention that violent revolution was a principle or 
doctrine” of the CPUSA.163  She somewhat tentatively conceded that 
“the Party might use revolution as a last resort; but she also insisted that 
American Communists never discussed violent revolution” and that the 
CPUSA “would have lost an awful lot of membership” if it had done 
so.164  Furthermore, she insisted, “most American Communists never 
read Marx or Lenin and did not understand Communist doctrine.”165  
Her refusal to support any of the propositions on which a successful 
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Smith Act prosecution of the leaders of the CPUSA would have to rest, 
clearly irritated Quinn.166 
Despite it, Justice Department leaders were determined to press 
forward with a prosecution based on the Smith Act.  Clark, supported 
by Quinn and Donegan, insisted that McGohey present this new case to 
the grand jury at the earliest possible date.167  The U.S. attorney, 
however, was unwilling to go ahead without thorough preparation.168  
“[H]e managed to prevail only by threatening to withdraw from the 
case.”169  It was finally agreed, apparently as some sort of compromise, 
that George Kneip from the Appeals Section of the Justice 
Department’s Criminal Division, would be sent up to New York to assist 
in drafting the indictments.170  After reviewing the FBI’s massive brief, 
Kneip reached a conclusion that underscored what a bad idea this 
prosecution was.171  In his opinion, the government would “be faced with 
a difficult task in seeking to prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that 
the Communist Party advocates revolution by violence.”172  If it could 
not do that to the satisfaction of a jury, then the defendants would be 
entitled to acquittal. 
Because of the anti-Communist hysteria that was building up in the 
country by the time the Communist leaders were tried in the summer of 
1949, that was unlikely to happen.  But it should have.  There were 
Communists who were guilty of espionage, but those were not the ones 
put on trial in the Dennis case.  The Dennis defendants were not spies 
but rather the victims of an unjustified and politically motivated 
prosecution.  Despite the fact the FBI regarded counterespionage as 
more important than prosecuting spies, in the Bentley case it undertook 
a massive probe aimed at least in part at obtaining enough admissible 
evidence to send spies to prison.  That effort failed, not because of any 
lack of commitment or effort on the Bureau’s part but simply due to bad 
luck.  Kim Philby’s betrayal prevented what might have been a 
successful prosecution for espionage and opened the door to one under 
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the Smith Act.  In that case, the FBI and federal prosecutors were 
enforcing a federal statute.  But that fact did nothing to protect the 
targets of the prosecution.  It did nothing to prevent and the sorry 
assault on civil liberties known to history as Dennis v. United States. 
 
